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I. Introduction and Background Information
“The global captive insurance market continued to grow in 2012, both in terms
of new captive formations and new captive domiciles . . . Worldwide, the number of
licensed captives increased to 6,052 at the end of 2012 from 5,807 a year earlier . .
.” This statement appeared in an article of Business Insurance entitled Captives
Grow as Economy Recovers published March 11, 2013. The news that the number
of captives had steadily increased to 6,000 worldwide was surprising to Japanese
insurance and risk management professionals (see Figure 1). The news is
contradictory to recent reports from Japanese risk professionals who report that the
total number of captives established and owned by Japanese corporations is
approximately eighty and that the number of Japanese captives is actually
decreasing. Why do Japanese corporations appear to be resistant to the establishment
of captives? Considering the size of the Japanese economy, the expected number of
Japanese captives should be over 1,000. There may be reasons that are not
financially-related that explain this lack of motivation. This study hypothesizes that
Japanese firms are capable of creating value using captives rather than purchasing
traditional insurance. Using examples of Japanese captives that are established in
European domiciles, we attempt to analyze this hypothesis. This is a significant
research topic for Japanese risk management academics and professionals.
This manuscript first adopts a qualitative approach to discuss the unique
features of European captive domiciles and the advantages of establishing captives
in Europe. Using a scenario approach with realistic data, we quantify the level and
the extent to which a Japanese firm can create value by establishing a pure captive
insurer in a major European captive domicile. This study examines the domiciles of
Guernsey, Luxembourg and Dublin, Ireland.
──────────────────────────────────────────
* Associate Professor, Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration, Institute of Business and
Accounting, Kwansei Gakuin University
Kwansei Gakuin University
Social Sciences Review
Vol. 18, 2013
Nishinomiya, Japan
１０１
Doherty (1985) defines a captive insurance company as a retention fund that
possesses its own corporate identity as a subsidiary of a noninsurance parent firm.
He then defines a captive insurance company as one that is owned by a
noninsurance parent company or companies, and as a company that underwrites the
insurance business of its parents directly or through the application of reinsurance
contracts. Lenrow et al. (1982) identified the following advantages of establishing
captive subsidiaries: 1) the investment income from reserve funds accrues to the
parent company rather than to an unrelated insurer; 2) captives offer certain tax
advantages over conventional insurance or other forms of retention; 3) captives offer
certain types of coverage which are difficult or expensive to obtain from the
conventional insurance market because of general market conditions or the poor
underwriting experience of insurers; 4) captives can access the reinsurance market
that is considered more competitive than the direct insurance market; 5) the
underwriting costs are lower than those offered by the unrelated insurer’s profit
markup; and 6) captives provide the incentives that motivate a company to
effectively control losses.
In response to Lenrow et al., Doherty (1985) stated that the incentives to form
a captive outweigh those of conventional insurance and can be summered into two
motivating factors. First, a captive may be formed with the purpose of obtaining
insurance on advantageous terms. Owning a captive insurance company can improve
a parent firm’s ability to negotiate for terms and conditions of an insurance contract
with an insurance company. Certain benefits include favorable reductions in
premiums for large deductibles, competitive pricing, or coverage of difficult-to-place
risks. Second, a captive may represent a genuine alternative to insurance. “Risk
finance” has become a popular term for finance risk. Financial and insurance
markets have created many ways to transfer or finance risk such as catastrophe
bonds, contingent debt, finite risk, contingent equity, credit default swap, weather
derivatives. A captive is an alternative financing scheme that allows corporations to
retain risk and receive funding from corporate family members, thereby diversifying
the financing risk and risk management.
With respect to small to medium size enterprises, captives can protect operating
business from higher taxation or creditors, where they provide wealth transfer
transactions (Adkisson, 2006). The transfer of wealth from a business owner to
family members can be achieved through the use of a captive. This feature is
especially attractive in countries with a high level of inheritance tax, which can
reach 50% in countries such as the United States (US) and Japan. As part of this
study, we interviewed consultants attending the Captive Conference held in Chicago
in 2012 and found a number of cases of captives functioning as conduits for wealth
transfer. If the captive is formed and owned by the children of the business owner
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and the children is over 21 years of age, the activities of the captive are not
attributable to the owner of federal gift and then US taxes are not applicable. The
insurance premiums that a firm pays to its captive are tax deductible. Therefore, the
owners’ wealth can be successfully transferred using premium transactions to
offspring using the offspring-owned captive (Adkisson, 2006). The recent sharp
increase in the number of micro- and mini-captives in such domiciles as the state of
Utah and Anguilla is attributable to this wealth transfer function. According to
Business Insurance statistics, Utah has 287 captives and is ranked the second largest
captive domicile in the US and sixth in the world, and Anguilla has 291 captives
and is ranked as the fifth largest captive domicile in the world. Tax avoidance with
respect to wealth transfer and the use of captives will be a significant future political
issue.
In addition to corporates captive demand, we posit that the increase in captives
is a result of a favorable regulatory environment. Within the US, captives face
inherent tax issues and challenges. The US tax laws concerning captives have been
uncertain until recently. Many courts battles between IRS (Internal Revenue Service,
the federal tax authority) and captive owners have argued the true meaning of
“insurance.” Courts rely on the US Supreme Court’s explanation that states
“Historically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing.”
The subsequent issue then is the determination of the factors that constitute risk
shifting and risk distributing. An unofficial safe harbor existed for many years that
was established by the IRS and assured that captives would not be challenged if
they underwrite at least 30% third-party risk. The revised safe harbor guidelines are
set at 50% third-party risk. If a captive underwrites at least 50% third-party risk, the
risk distribution requirement is satisfactory met. Captives are able to meet this
requirement simply by accepting quality reinsurance risks or selling reinsurance to
another insurance company and receiving a premium in return. The IRS would
challenge a captive if it does not act as insurance company. Domicile states,
however, offer rigid procedures or advice that captives be registered as insurance
companies. Once a captive is officially registered in a domicile and is conducting
genuine insurance business, the IRS will not initiate a challenge. We argue that a
regulatory environment that allows corporations to comfortably run captive business
without legal challenge from the IRS can explain the increase in US captives.
In summary, there are a number of rational reasons why corporations form
captives onshore and offshore captives. Corporate demand has resulted in an
increase in the the number of captives to over 6,000, with an additional 100 or 200
captives forming each year. Figure 1 presents the recent, worldwide total captive
growth trend.
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II. A Summary of the Related Literature
Despite the existence of more than 6,000 captives worldwide, around 90 of
which are of Japanese firms, there is a paucity of research on Japanese captives
compared to US and European firms. The results from the studies of U.S. and
European captives can be applied partially to Japanese captives. Differences exist in
the Japanese business environment and there are pronounced differences in the legal
liability exposure of Japanese corporations. Morimiya (1997), Hiyoshi (2000),
Yoshizawa (2001) and Goto (2005) have examined the benefits and challenges of
captives worldwide, the global trends that fuel captive growth, and the captive
dynamic with respect to other financing methods. Maeda (2005) demonstrated
through qualitative analysis the corporate demand for Japanese captives.
The lack of publically available data with respect to the performance of
captives regardless of their nationalities may have resulted in conflicting conclusions
from the empirical findings concerning the ability of captives to generate value for
parent firms. Diallo and Kim (1989) and Adams and Hillier (2000) use event study
methods to examine whether the establishment of a captive insurer creates value for
its shareholders. The studies demonstrate that although the share value of the captive
parent remains unchanged, the non-significant negative drift of the cumulative
abnormal return on the parent’s stock may indicate that an amount considered
negligible to all stockholders might be significant for certain managers. They thus
contend that the welfare gain derived from the creation of captives is likely to
Figure 1 Total Number of Captives
(Source: Business Insurance, 2013)
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benefit the managers of the parent firm rather than the shareholders. This conclusion
is similar to the conclusion of Scordis and Porat (1998) who demonstrate that firms
with captive insurers are more likely to experience manager-owner conflicts than
firms that do not form captives. Adams and Hillier (2000) partially attribute their
results to captive formation by managers for their own benefits. They provide
evidence that the incorporation of captive insurers is somewhat detrimental to value.
The study uses a sample of 120 captives of United Kingdom (U.K.) corporations.
They find negative stock reaction to the news that a captive insurer has been
formed, however, the reaction amounted to less than a percentage point.
The study of Scordis et al. (2007) employed Monte Carlo simulations on
general captives in Bermuda and British Virgin Island to identify sustainable
conditions where captives exhibit a high probability of creating positive shareholder
value. The study finds that, on average, captives have a low probability of
generating shareholders value. Well-managed captives, however, have a high
probability of generating shareholder value. The study also finds that the captives of
parents with low systematic risk have the highest probabilities of creating the value.
Maeda et al. (2011) studied shareholder value creation by applying a similar
methodology of Scordis et al. (2007) to a Japanese captive established in Guernsey,
Bermuda and Hawaii but expanded further into enterprise risk management and
finite risk schemes into captives. Maeda et al (2011) found a high likelihood that a
captive generates economic value for its Japanese parent firm especially when it
operated over multiple years. They find that when the captive reinsurers its entire
book of business, thus acting as a vehicle for access the global reinsurance market,
it delivers approximate break-even economic value. The captive can generate a high
level of economic value but only by adopting a higher level of operating risk. They
find that the value-maximizing strategy is for a Japanese corporation to establish its
captive in Bermuda while the risk-minimizing strategy is to establish its captive in
Guernsey. They also demonstrate that Bermuda offers favorable risk-return tradeoffs
for Japanese captives compared to Hawaii.
Our study expands the methodology of Maeda et al. (2011) with respect to
Japanese captives established in European domiciles, namely Guernsey, Luxembourg
and Dublin, Ireland. This study describes the feasibility of Japanese firms expanding
into European markets through a captive vehicle. All of the data used in this study
are the most recent for the business environment and current tax and legal liability
legislation in Japan. The following sections examine the characteristics of the
European captive domiciles and our research methodology.
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III. The European Captive Domiciles
We categorize the onshore and offshore global captive market into four
regions: the US and Canada, the Caribbean, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
According to Business Insurance (2013), the captive markets for the four regions are
36.9% for the US and Canada, 44.1% for the Caribbean, 16.8% for Europe, and
2.3% for the Asia-Pacific region. The Caribbean market is the largest, followed by
the US and Canada, and Europe. The Asia-Pacific market is still in the infant stage.
There are no captive domiciles within Japan, although Nago of Okinawa declared to
be so in 2004 (Maeda and Sakai, 2007) during the Koizumi regime, but there are no
captives established in the city. We conclude that the first domicile in Japan failed
for many reasons.
Each domicile market possesses unique characteristics. The Caribbean market
includes Bermuda and the Cayman Islands; the world’s largest and second largest
captive market in terms of numbers. These captive markets are composed mainly of
offshore captive domiciles that offer a corporate income tax-free environment, a
flexible and business-friendly regulatory environment, natural resources, and
entertainments that attract substantial insurance companies, reinsurance companies,
and financial institutions including banks, hedge funds, and various types of special
purpose vehicles established for investment purposes. Because of the advanced
business infrastructure, those domiciles provide conveniences such as “one-stop
shopping,” where all the services that captives require are provided within the
boundaries of a small city, Hamilton in Bermuda for example (Maeda, 2012).
The US and Canada captive market attracts mostly US and Canadian firms.
The market provides US companies visible state registrations, political stability, and
a lower level of legal liability. Thus, safety, comfort, convenience, and easy access
are provided for US and Canadian firms. The state of Vermont, for example, attracts
captives by offering flexible registrations according to corporate need while holding
captive seminars and annual conferences for the captive market. Vermont has
committed to the institutionalization of captive registrations (Maeda, 2012). Risk
Retention Groups are registered according to a state captive law.
Contrastingly, the European captive market initiated captive business in the
early 1920s with the establishment of group captives (Bawcutt, 2001). Group
captives are jointly owned by two or more parents and underwrite the risks of those
parents (Doherty, 1985). Certain domiciles attracted protected cells, or rent-a-
captives called “PCCs” (protected cell companies) or “ICCs” (incorporated cell
companies) that resemble group captives. Certain domiciles focus on reinsurance
captives and equalization reserve. Other domiciles accommodate direct captives and
include Dublin in Ireland, Gibraltar and the Nordic nations such as Sweden and
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Norway. The following sub-section compares the benefits of the three major
European captive domiciles, Guernsey, Luxembourg, and Dublin, Ireland.
1. Guernsey: A Domicile for PCCs and ICCs
Guernsey is one of the Channel Islands, dependent on the UK but not subject
to UK taxes, or European Union (EU) legislation for insurance purposes
(International Risk Management Institute. 2013). Among the European domiciles,
Guernsey is the largest and oldest because it initiated captive business in 1922.
Protected by the UK military, the island offers a flexible tax structure, well-
established infrastructure, and close proximity to London and the European
countries. One of Guernsey’s characteristics is its popularity as a domain for PCCs
and ICCs.
Guernsey first passed the Protected Cell Companies Ordinance in 1997 and
amended it in 2002. Recent legislation for ICC was introduced in 2006. Protected
cell companies or incorporated cell companies are essentially rent-a-captives that
offer less expensive and easier captive formation than pure or group captive
formation. Rent-a-captives are captives that are rented by various firms. There can
be a number of cells in a PCC and each cell is rented out to an individual parent.
PCCs possess a special provision that legally separates the assets and liabilities in
each account or cell from other cells to ensure that a bankruptcy of one cell does
not affect another. To further illustrate individual cells, incorporated cell companies
are registered individually to retain certain benefits. The companies in Guernsey that
have no experience of captive operations, or face significant difficulty such as high
Figure 2 The Number of Protected Cell Captives Worldwide
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establishment costs may first use PCCs or ICCs in Guernsey. There were a total of
333 captives including PCCs and ICCs in Guernsey by 2012. Figure 2 presents the
number of PCCs, which increased to 320 by the end of 2012. According to
International Risk Management Institute (2013), Guernsey had over 300 total cells
in PCCs alone in 2010, which represents a significant percentage of captive
insurance market.
2. Luxembourg: A Domicile for Reinsurance Captives
A vibrant financial center surrounded by Germany, France and Belgium,
Luxembourg has attracted many multinational corporations that established
headquarters in Europe such as Amazon.com, Rakuten and Delphi. Luxembourg is
also one of the world’s foremost captive domiciles. The current number of captives
is 238 and, according to Business Insurance (2013), the eighth largest in the world
and the second among the European domiciles as of the end of 2012. Luxembourg
initiated captive business in 1984 when its captive reinsurance market opened. It
offers a number of benefits to captives including business-friendly regulations; a
well-established infrastructure of banking, investment, actuarial, accounting and
legal services; political stability; and close proximity to the London and European
markets (International Risk Management Institute, 2013).
In the article Captive Review, 2012, Mr. Victor Rod, insurance commissioner at
Commissariat aux Assurances, stated that Luxembourg initiated captive business to
offer European captive owners a domicile in the EU that would allow them to do
business onshore. The country has established an environment that offers captives
normal tax policies and a favorable business environment in which to conduct
transactions; Luxembourg has become a fully diversified international financial
center.
A unique feature of Luxembourg’s captive business is the predominance of
reinsurance captives. Reinsurance captives typically utilize a fronting insurance
company between the parent and the captive. Reinsurance captives, therefore, are
influenced by the traditional insurance market or the fronting local insurance market.
The advantage of this is that if the local insurance market is a smooth market with
low premiums, the parent is less willing to transfer premiums into the captive.
Conversely, if the local market is experiencing increasing premiums, the parent is
more willing to transfer risk into the captive. This adjustment is facilitated by
altering the amount of reinsurance that the captive sells to the fronting insurance
company. When a Japanese firm located in Japan is to establish a captive overseas,
the Japanese firm must use a licensed fronting insurance company that creates a
reinsurance contract with the offshore captive. In Japan’s case, the local insurance
regulations require an insurance contract be made only with a licensed insurance
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company; therefore, the use of reinsurance captive is the norm.
Additionally, captives can build equalization reserves. Captives can set up
accounts that build a high tax suspended reserve. These extra reserves are tax
exempt and accumulate capital in periods of scare claims that can fund larger claims
later on. Equalization reserves thus permit captives to accumulate substantial capital
without paying taxes.
3. Dublin of Ireland: The Financial Center for UK
Dublin is the capital of the Republic of Ireland and shares the island with
Northern Island, a part of the UK. Ireland became independent of the British
Commonwealth in 1949 and is a member of the European Economic Community
(EEC). Ireland initiated captive business in 1987 at the same time that it opened the
International Financial Services Centre in Dublin. Leading financial institutions
including Zurich, Ace, XL, Generali insurance companies, Deutsch, Citi, Sumitomo
banks, and Merrill Lynch are located in Dublin (Ikeuchi et al. 2012).
Dublin has developed advanced infrastructure and business-friendly regulations
for financial institutions including captives. Dublin is recognized as an international
financial center and invites internationally recognized companies primarily from
Europe, the US and Japan (International Risk Management Institute, 2013).
Currently, Ireland accommodates 141 captives and ranks fifteenth in the world and
third among the European domiciles as of the end of 2012, according to Business
Insurance (2013).
Table 1 Certain Important Regulatory Features and Statistics of Three Domiciles
Guernsey Luxembourg Dublin, Ireland
Number of captives as of year-end 2012 333 238 141
World ranking by number 4 8 15
Minimum capitalization rate £900,000  1,225,000  635,000
Licensing fees Application fee
£5,054; Annual fee
£5,040.
Incorporation fee
 1,500; Annual fee:
 3,000−15,000.
Initial fee  5,709;
Supervision fee
 635−31,743.
Captive tax rate 0% 30% 12.5%
Note: The value of minimum
capitalization rate and
licensing fee applies
only to non-life
business.
The value of minimum
capitalization rate and
licensing fee applies
only to reinsurance
captives.
The value of minimum
capitalization rate
applies only to
reinsurance captives.
(Source: Captive Insurance Companies Association (2012), Business Insurance (2013) and International Risk
Management Institute (2013))
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Dublin is popular for captives because direct writing captives can be formed
and they can issue direct insurance policies across borders into other EU countries
(Bawcutt, 2001). A captive can underwrite insurance coverage that is related to its
parent’s European business without paying fronting fees or purchasing insurance
from local insurers. Unlike Luxembourg where captives are mostly formed as
reinsurance vehicles, those formed in Dublin can directly insure European-located
risks without costly fronting arrangements. Therefore, many captives formed in
Dublin have US corporations as parents (Ikeuchi et al., 2012).
Table 1 compares certain important regulatory features and statistics of the
three domiciles examined in this study. The minimum capitalization rate, licensing
fees and captive tax rates that were used for our study are discussed in the following
sections.
IV. The Research Methodology
This section identifies the value that is from the formation of a captive in the
three examined European domiciles by a Japanese firm using a scenario approach.
1. Regulations
Japanese Insurance Law requires that insurance coverage for Japan risks be
purchased by an admitted and licensed insurance company. If an offshore captive
insures Japanese-located risk, it must act as a reinsurance captive that sells
reinsurance on the parent’s risk with a licensed Japanese insurer. Additionally, if a
subsidiary of a Japanese firm is located in a country where the income tax rate is
equal to or below 20 percent, the country is considered “tax haven” according to the
Japanese tax code. If the country is determined a “tax haven,” the corporation must
consolidate the net income in Japan and pay tax according to the Japan tax code.
Therefore, a corporation cannot avoid tax by establishing a subsidiary in a tax haven
country. This tax code also applies to a captive overseas. With respect to the three
domiciles included in this study, Guernsey (zero tax) and Dublin (12.5% tax rate)
are treated as “tax haven” countries, whereas Luxembourg (30% tax rate) is not.
The Japanese tax code was amended in 2009 with the addition of the “foreign
dividend exclusion.” The revised code allows a multi-national corporation to
consider 95% of dividends paid by its foreign subsidiary as a nontaxable income
(KPMG, 2012) when the subsidiary is owned at least 25% by a Japanese
corporation. Only 5% of foreign income would be taxed in Japan if it is paid back
as dividends.
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2. The Base Case Scenario
We assume that a captive is formed as a reinsurance captive using a fronting
arrangement in Japan, capitalized, and then operates as required for four years in
domiciles such as Guernsey, Luxembourg, and Dublin. We calculate the values
created by a captive in each domicile. The parent pays to the fronting insurer a
fronting fee equivalent to 5% of net premium written. The fronting insurer does not
cover any underwriting risks. The captive creates a loss reserve to manage the
payment of losses independently. The captive does not purchase reinsurance
coverage. The captive continues to operate insurance business until the fourth year
and run off until the sixth year to pay out all liabilities when it liquidates in the
seventh year.
Losses and Claim Payout: For simplicity, we assume that the parent’s expected
loss for a year is consistent at ¥40 million and the claim payout is also consistent at
25%, 50%, and 25%. This payout implies that the total loss accrued for a given year
is ¥40 million, but the actual claim payments are its 25% for the year that the loss
occurred, 50% for the next year, and 25% for the third year because many losses
take time to settle. The claims are assumed to be paid out over three years. All the
liabilities for claims that occurred over the four years of captive operation are
therefore settled and all losses are paid through the sixth year before the captive is
liquidated in the seventh year.
Net Premium Written: The parent pays insurance premiums to the local insurer at
the Japanese rate. The premiums are calculated by combining expected loss amounts
and underwriting expense. The underwriting expense we used for premium values is
referenced in the Statistics of Japanese Non-Life Insurance Business (2012), which
provides the industry-wide underwriting expense ratio of 33.8% for 2011. The net
premium written (NPW ) charged to the risk can be calculated given the
underwriting expense ratio (UER ) by the following calculation:
NPW＝ 11－UER
The net premium written for the expected loss of ¥40 million is approximately
¥60.4 million. This premium is assumed to be consistent over the period of the
captive operation. The net premium written paid to the captive is translated into the
local currency at the recent exchange rates: ¥131.22 per Euro and ¥155.11 per
British pounds as of September 4, 2013 (Yahoo Finance).
Initial Capitalization and Costs of Captive Operation: For initial capital
investments transferred into the captive, we used a minimum value for the required
capitalization rate of domicile as presented in Table 1. The application fee,
incorporation fee or initial fee in addition to maintenance fees for registrations are
also presented in Table 1. Other operational expenses including management fees,
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attorney fees, actuarial fees, other servicing costs are 15% of the net premium
income, a practical best estimate.
Investment Return: The investment return as a percentage of investment income on
an investment asset that we used in this study is referenced in the Statistics of
Japanese Non-Life Insurance Business (2012), which provides the industry-wide
interest income, dividend income and investment assets. We used an averaged value
by dividing the total interests and dividend incomes by the total investment assets of
the industry-wide values. The average value yields 1.91%.
Discount rate: To obtain a present value, a discount rate is required. The two major
sources of risk in cash flows are derived from investment returns and the random
occurrence of loss events (Doherty, 1985). We consider that insurance losses are
uncorrelated with the market risk and therefore no systematic risk is present.
Investment income with respect to a captive has a certain level of systematic risk
and this increases the discount rate above the risk-free rate. The risk-free rate that
we used is the Japanese Government 10-year maturity bond annual yield obtained
by Thompson Reuters’ Data Stream. Over the past ten years, this has yielded an
annual average of 1.309%. The weighted average rate for discounting that we used
is 2%.
Financial Forecasting and Net Present Values: Based on the base case scenario,
but using different values for costs and regulatory requirements, we create pro-forma
financial statements for a captive established in each domicile. First, we used
identical expected loss values, claim payouts, and reserves but in the local currency
units. A pro-forma income statement is created followed by a pro-forma cash flow
statement for a captive and the parent. A terminal value is identified from the
captive’s cash flow statement and this is inserted into the parent’s cash flow
statement. We can determine the value by a captive based on the expected cash
flows of the parent’s cash flow statement. We also determine a net present value of
the parent using traditional insurance. The net present value of the parent using
traditional insurance is then subtracted from the net present value of a captive to
obtain the incremental value being created by a captive.
IV. Results and Discussion
Tables 2 to Table 6 illustrate a comparison of the expected financial statements
of a Guernsey captive and the cash flows of the parent with respect to the use of
traditional insurance.
We found that in all cases that net present values become positive, which
indicates that captives will bring the parent company positive net present values. We
conclude that the establishment of captives results in incremental value creation that
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cannot be achieved through traditional insurance.
The value that is created as a result of establishing a Guernsey captive rather
than purchasing traditional insurance is calculated by subtracting the net present
value of purchasing insurance from the net present value of a Guernsey captive. For
example, in Guernsey, the net present value of the captive is negative £859,025 (see
Table 5) whereas purchasing insurance is negative £993,366 (see Table 6). The
incremental value is the subtraction of negative £993,366 from negative £859,025,
which gives a positive value of £134,342 or ¥20,837,721.
A similar process is conducted for a Luxembourg captive and a Dublin captive
to compare captives and traditional insurance. Several values in the tables reflect the
differences in regulatory requirements, tax codes, and costs. The incremental values
that are created by a Luxembourg captive and a Dublin captive are also positive,  
126,238 or ¥165,565,004 and  116,865 or ¥15,335,040, respectively.
We found that, of the three domiciles, the Guernsey captive provides the parent
company with the highest expected value (¥20,837,721), followed by Luxembourg
Table 2 The Expected Value of Claim Payments by a Guernsey Captive
The Year that the Claim was Paid in Pounds
1 2 3 4 5 6
The Year the Loss Ocurred:
1
2
3
4
Total Claims Paid:
Reserve:
64,470
64,470
193,411
128,941
64,470
193,411
257,882
64,470
128,941
64,470
257,882
257,882
64,470
128,941
64,470
257,882
257,882
64,470
128,941
193,411
64,470
64,470
64,470
0
Table 3 Pro-forma Income Statement of a Guernsey Captive
Year (unit in pounds)
1 2 3 4
Premiums earned:
Expenses:
Initial set−up cost
Annual fee
Operating costs
Total costs
Incurred losses:
Paid losses plus
Changes in reserve
Underwriting income:
389,549
5,054
5,040
58,432
68,526
64,470
−193,411
63,141
389,549
5,040
58,432
63,472
193,411
−64,470
68,195
389,549
5,040
58,432
63,472
257,882
0
68,195
389,549
5,040
58,432
63,472
257,882
0
68,195
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Table 4 Cash Flows of a Guernsey Captive
Year (unit in pounds)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Capital:
From previous year
＋Premium
＋Surplus
Expenses:
Initial set-up costs
Annual fee
Operational costs
Total expenses:
Investment funds at the beginning of year:
Investment income:
Losses paid:
Capital at the year-end before tax:
Taxes:
On earnings
On investment:
Total Taxes
Capital at the year-end after tax
389,549
900,000
5,054
5,040
58,432
68,526
1,221,023
23,322
64,470
1,179,874
0
0
0
1,179,874
1,179,874
389,549
0
0
5,040
58,432
63,472
1,505,951
28,764
193,411
1,341,303
0
0
0
1,341,303
1,341,303
389,549
0
0
5,040
58,432
63,472
1,667,380
31,847
257,882
1,441,345
0
0
0
1,441,345
1,441,345
389,549
0
0
5,040
58,432
63,472
1,767,422
33,758
257,882
1,543,298
0
0
0
1,543,298
1,543,298
0
0
0
1,543,298
29,477
193,411
1,379,364
0
0
0
1,379,364
1,379,364
0
0
0
1,379,364
26,346
64,470
1,341,240
0
0
0
1,341,240
1,341,240
Table 5 Cash Flows of Parent in Japan for a Guernsey Captive and its Value
Year (unit in pounds)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Premium to captive
Fronting fee payments
Surplus contribution
Value of tax shield on premium
Consolidated tax to be paid in Japan
Terminal value of captive
Total
NPV of a Guernsey captive @ the discount rate
−389,549
−19,477
−900,000
136,342
−22,099
−1,194,784
−859,025
−389,549
−19,477
0
136,342
−23,868
−296,553
−389,549
−19,477
0
136,342
−23,868
−296,553
−389,549
−19,477
0
136,342
−23,868
−296,553 0 0
1,341,240
1,341,240
Table 6 Cash Flows of Parent for Insurance Purchase and its Value
Year (unit in pounds)
1 2 3 4
Insurance premium
Value of tax shield on insurance premium
Total
NPV of insurance @ a risk free rate
Value created by a captive
−389,549
136,342
−253,207
−993,366
−389,549
136,342
−253,207
−389,549
136,342
−253,207
−389,549
136,342
−253,207
134,342 pounds
20,837,721 JPY
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(¥16,565,004) and Dublin (¥15,335,040). Please see Table 7 for this comparison.
Guernsey and Dublin are treated as “tax haven,” while Luxembourg is not. A
negative impact from the payment of consolidated tax in Japan on the net income of
a Guernsey captive does not significantly affect the value in comparison with the
Luxembourg captive, where the parent does not need to pay similar taxes. The result
of our ranking based on the value creation is consistent with the world ranking of
captives with respect to the number of captives (see Table 1).
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of value creation by a Guernsey captive by
changing certain important factors: investment return, operational costs of a captive
and expected loss. The sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 8. Similar results
are obtained for a Luxembourg and a Dublin captive.
The sensitivity analysis in Table 8 demonstrates that a positive change in a
single percentage point in investment returns brings a significant increase in positive
value (about ¥13 million) to the company, whereas a single negative percentage
change will have a significant negative impact. Lowering operational cost by a
single percentage point will yield approximately ¥1.5 million. These two sensitivity
results suggest that the captive creates more value by lowering the operational costs
while maximizing investment returns. The results also demonstrate that investment
performance has a more significant impact on value than a reduction in operational
Table 7 The Value that is Created by a Captive
Domicile
Value created by a captive
in local currency in JPY
Guernsey 134,342 20,837,721
Luxembourg 126,238 16,565,004
Dublin 116,865 15,335,040
Table 8 Sensitivity Analysis on a Guernsey Captive
1) Investment return 0.91% 1.91% 2.91%
Value added by captive
Difference
2) Operational costs % of NPW
¥8,043,851
(¥12,793,870)
14%
¥20,837,721
15%
¥34,273,524
¥13,435,803
16%
Value added by captive
Difference
3) Expected loss
¥22,353,760
¥1,516,039
JPY 39 million
¥20,837,721
JPY 40 million
¥19,321,683
(¥1,516,038)
JPY 41 million
Value added by captive
Difference
¥20,236,671
(¥601,050)
¥20,837,721 ¥21,438,772
¥601,051
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costs.
The sensitivity results with respect to expected losses demonstrate that,
unexpectedly, the larger the expected loss the more value is added. The reason for
this might be because net premium written is calculated to be higher when the
expected loss is higher. This reasoning is demonstrated by a comparison of the
value added when we lower the loss amount while maintaining the premium levels.
For example, if we maintain the premium and lower the loss amount to ¥39 million
from ¥40 million, the value added at a Guernsey is approximately a positive ¥2.4
million, in contrast to the negative value in the aforementioned sensitivity result. We
can therefore argue that the captive adds more value to the company if the premium
volume is higher. A captive bring more value to a company if it collects larger
premiums from its parents and/or sister companies.
V. Conclusion
This study investigated to what extent a Japanese corporation can create value
by establishing a pure captive insurer in a major European captive domicile. The
domiciles that were examined in this study were Guernsey, Luxembourg, and
Dublin. We used recent data to develop a realistic base case scenario that considered
regulatory requirements, costs, and taxes in Japan in addition to the domicile
locations. We created expected values in pro-forma financial statements that spanned
a seven-year time period assuming the loss amount is constant. We applied discount
rates from recent Japanese market information to calculate net present values. We
subtracted the net present value of purchasing insurance from the net present value
with the captive to determine the value added from the establishment of a captive in
Europe.
Our base case scenario for the captives in these domiciles demonstrates that the
Japanese captives create incremental positive value to the parent. A Guernsey
captive brings the largest net present value, followed by a Luxembourg captive, and
then a Dublin captive. This study included a sensitivity analysis on investment
returns and operational costs and losses. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that
the captive creates more value with respect to investment performance rather than
by lowering operational costs. We also find that a captive bring more value if it
collects large premiums from its parents and/or sister companies. The greater the
premium the parent pays to a captive the greater the value the captive creates. Our
results are consistent with the previous literature such as Maeda et al. (2011), which
concludes that Japanese captives have the capability to generate value.
Yuji MAEDA１１６
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